Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Mark B. Levinger, Assistant Attorney General, 1100 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Crippen, Judge.

Appellant Charles Gordon Long challenges (1) the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Corrections and the State of Minnesota (collectively the State) and (2) the court's determinations that (a) the registration requirement of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (1996) does not violate his Alford plea and (b) the registration statute is constitutional. Because we find (1) the registration requirement does not violate Long's guilty plea and (2) the registration statute is constitutional, we affirm.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.02 provides that a defending party may move for summary judgment at any time. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that all dispositive motions be considered in one hearing. Further, a district court has the discretion to defer ruling on a motion. 2A David F. Herr & Roger S. Haydock, Minnesota Practice, § 56.12 (1985). The district court explicitly stated in its April 16, 1996, order that it did not construe the State's January 30, 1996, document as a motion for summary judgment, and thus, in effect the court defers its decision. We conclude the district court did not err in holding a separate hearing on the State's motion.

Long also argues the district court erred in granting the State's summary judgment motion "because there remain issues of triable fact." This court will not review a claim when appellant fails to provide an adequate record and review would result in speculation. Taflin v. Taflin, 366 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn. App. 1985). We reject this argument because Long did not specify which statements from the discovery materials present genuine issues of material fact rendering summary judgment improper.

Minnesota courts have adopted the rules regarding Alford pleas that were established in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977). Under an Alford plea, a defendant may plead guilty to an offense, even though the defendant maintains his or her innocence, if the defendant reasonably believes, and the record establishes, that the State has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970).

"A proper factual basis must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate." Id. (citing Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 221 N.W.2d 698 (1974)). It is the responsibility of the district court to determine whether an adequate factual basis has been established in the record. Id. (citing State v. Milton, 295 N.W.2d 94, 95 (Minn. 1980)). An adequate factual basis ensures the plea is voluntary and represents an intelligent choice based on the alternative courses of action available. Id. (citing State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977)). We therefore conclude, contrary to Long's assertion, the law does require the district court to find an adequate factual basis for an Alford plea. But the factual basis goes to the evidence against defendant and high probability that he will be convicted on it.

An Alford plea carries the collateral consequences of a typical guilty plea as long as the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and there is a sufficient factual basis to support it. Blohm v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Serv., 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993). Long entered a guilty plea and was convicted of attempted criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree. Consequently, there is no need to remand the case to reestablish Long's guilt.

Long claims the registration requirement violates his plea agreement. Specifically, Long argues the district court waived the registration requirement, and he had previously withdrawn his guilty plea because of such a requirement. The district court found there was no discussion of the registration statute when Long decided to withdraw his guilty plea and the registration requirement was never waived. The record supports the district court's findings.

Long argues the registration statute constitutes punishment and thus violates the double jeopardy clause of the Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. 1, Sec. 7. In State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. App. 1995), this court acknowledged that the registration statute historically has not been viewed as punishment. Following the historical perspective in Manning, we reject Long's double jeopardy argument.

Long also argues that the registration statute interferes with his right to privacy, thus imposing a prior restraint on his freedom to associate. We reject this argument for two reasons: First, "[a]n offender's conviction is a matter of public record regardless of the registration." Id. Second, the registration information is "private data" that may be used for law enforcement purposes only. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 7 (1996).

Next, Long argues the registration requirement restrains his freedom of movement. We disagree. The registration statute only requires offenders to give prior written notice before they change their residence, and the requirement alone does not restrain their freedom of movement. Id.

Regarding movement out of state, Long does not have standing to challenge this part of the statute because he has not demonstrated that he has moved out of state or intends to move out of state. See St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Marzitelli, 258 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 1977) (a litigant may not challenge the constitutionality of a statute if he is unable to show that the statute has been or is about to be applied to his disadvantage).

Finally, Long argues the registration statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. When a statute applies to a person's conduct, that person may not successfully challenge the statute for vagueness. State v. Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484, 490 (Minn. 1995). The registration statute applies to criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree, therefore, Long cannot challenge the statute for vagueness. Also, because Long did not state which of his First Amendment rights was impaired by the statute, we reject Long's argument that the registration statute is overbroad.

Affirmed.