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**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A07-1243**

Rudolph Gordon Cooper, Jr.,
Appellant,

vs.

Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, et al.,
Respondents.

**Filed May 20, 2008
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge**

Ramsey County District Court
File No. C3-06-5142

Rudolph Gordon Cooper, Jr., Community Corrections Center, Volunteers of America, 2825 East Lake Street, Minneapolis, MN 55406 (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Mark B. Levinger, Assistant Attorney General, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 900, St. Paul, MN 55101-2128 (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Minge, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

KALITOWSKI, Judge

Appellant Rudolph Gordon Cooper, Jr. challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondent Bureau of Criminal Apprehension and the dismissal of

his complaint disputing his obligation to register as a predatory offender pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2006). We affirm.

DECISION

Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(c) (2006), the period of his obligation to register as a predatory offender was properly extended. We disagree.

Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. *Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey*, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 1998). A statute’s “words and phrases are construed according to the rules of grammar” and their plain and common meaning unless they embody some special significance. Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1) (2006). When construing a statute, we presume that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2006). And we construe a statute as a whole and interpret it, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions so that “no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.” *Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl*, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000) (quoting *Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp.*, 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999)).

A person convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct is required to register as a predatory offender under the registration statute. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(1)(iii) (2006). Appellant does not dispute that he was required to register following his 1991 and 1994 qualifying offenses. In 2000, the legislature added subdivision 6(c), which states currently:

If a person required to register under this section is subsequently incarcerated following a conviction for a new offense or following a revocation of probation, supervised release, or conditional release for any offense, the person shall continue to register until ten years have elapsed since the person was last released from incarceration.

Id., subd. 6(c). Appellant does not dispute that he was convicted of two new offenses after the 2000 amendment. But appellant argues that his 2002 and 2005 convictions for counterfeiting and driving while intoxicated are not “new offenses” under subdivision 6(c) of the registration statute.

First, appellant argues that a “new offense” under subdivision 6(c) should be read to include only the offenses listed in subdivision 1b. But whereas subdivision 1b enumerates the offenses triggering the initial duty to register, under subdivision 6(c) *any* new offense can extend the registry period. And appellant’s argument ignores the fact that subdivision 6(d) refers specifically to the subdivision 1b offenses when it limits the term “offense.” *See id.*, subd. 6(d) (2006) (“[i]f the person is convicted of . . . *any offense for which registration is required under subdivision 1b*”) (emphasis added). In contrast, the legislature did not limit the term “new offense” in the subdivision relevant here. *Id.*, subd. 6(c). We conclude that, in light of the plain meaning of subdivision 6(c) and the policy in favor of construing statutes as a whole, the district court’s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 was correct.

Alternatively, appellant argues that his registration obligation cannot lawfully be extended because he was not incarcerated or under supervision for his criminal sexual

conduct convictions when the amendment took effect on August 1, 2000. The 2000 version of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 added the following provisions:

(a) All provisions of this section shall apply to a predatory offender convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for an offense described in subdivision 1 that requires registration if the offender is incarcerated or on any form of supervision for that offense as of the effective date of this subdivision, regardless of the date of the predatory offender's conviction or delinquency adjudication.

(b) Paragraph (a) does not change the obligation of any offender to register who began to register under this section before April 4, 2000.

Id., subd. 10 (2000). But subdivision 10 was repealed in 2001 “effective retroactively from April 4, 2000.” 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 8, art. 9, § 9(b), at 2092. Thus, that language has no force today. Moreover, even if it had not been repealed, the provision governing the effective date of subdivision 6(c) makes the subdivision applicable to appellant. The legislature stated that subdivision 6(c) is “effective August 1, 2000, and appl[ies] to persons . . . subject to registration.” 2000 Minn. Laws ch. 311, art. 2, § 16(h), at 207. Because appellant was subject to registration on August 1, 2000, subdivision 6(c) applies to him. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for respondent, dismissing appellant’s claim that he should not be subject to registration.

Affirmed.